Acerbi & Hodson [2025] FedCFamC1F 87: Understanding the Court’s Approach to Name Change Applications for Children

By Caitlin Elliott – Special Counsel


Can I change my child’s name?

The 2025 judgment of Her Honour Justice Brasch in Acerbi & Hodson [2025] FedCFamC1F 87 is an informative and practical example of how the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia determines applications for a child’s name to be changed.

General considerations in name change applications

Section 4 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (the Act) states that a decision about a child’s name is a major-long term issue. Such decisions are to be made jointly by the child’s parents. If parents cannot agree, they can apply to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Court) seeking orders regarding their child’s name.

The Court is empowered to order a child’s name be changed pursuant to section 64B(2)(i) of the Act, which provides that the Court can make parenting orders dealing with “any aspect of the care, welfare or development of the child or any other aspect of parental responsibility for a child”.

The paramount consideration of the Court in determining such an application is the best interests of the child.

Recent change of name application decision: Acerbi & Hodson [2025] FedCFamC1F 87

The 2025 ex-tempore decision of Her Honour Justice Brasch in Acerbi & Hodson [2025] FedCFamC1F 87 (Acerbi) considered the following matters when determining whether to change a child’s name:

1. Any embarrassment likely to be experienced by the child if his or her name is different from the parent with residence or care and control.
   
   
2. Any confusion of identity which may arise for the child if his or her name is changed or is not changed.
   
   
3. The effect any change in surname may have on the relationship between the child and the parent whose name the child bore during the relationship.
   
   
4. The effect of frequent or random changes of name.
   
   
5. The contact that the non-custodial parent has had and is likely to have in the future with the child.
   
   
6. The degree of identification that the child or children have with their non-custodial parent.
   
   
7. The degree of identification which the child or children have with the parent with whom they live.

The facts in Acerbi as they related to the issue of the children’s names were as follows:

1. There were three children:
   
   

1. The eldest, X, born in 2007.
   
   

2. Y was born in 2013. Y’s father was Mr B.
   
   

3. Z was born in 2017. Her father was Mr Michelakis, the second respondent in the proceedings.
   
   

2. The Applicants (Mr and Mrs Acerbi) were the children’s carers. They were neighbours or friends of the first respondent mother and had cared for the three children for some time.
   
   

3. The first respondent mother was Ms Hodson. She was in a correctional facility and appeared online from the facility for the final hearing. Ms Hodson was in the correctional facility because of her involvement in Mr E’s crime. Whilst the mother was known in the proceedings as Ms Hodson, she had changed her name legally to Mrs E.
   
   
   
4. The mother changed the children’s last names to that of Mr E a few months after he perpetrated the crime against Y’s father (and died) on the basis that she considered that the children ought keep a link to the name of Mr E (because that was now the mother’s legal last name, and she wanted all the children to have the same last name). Mr E did not have a biological relationship with any of the children.
   
   
   
5. The second respondent was Mr Michelakis (Z’s father).
   
   

6. There was also an Independent Children’s Lawyer (ICL) appointed, who spoke with the children in the weeks leading up to the final hearing.
   
   

7. X was adamant about his last name being changed to that of Mr C and that order was made by consent in the proceedings. Y found the name of Mr E “upsetting” and said, “it did not feel right”, and the ICL highlighted that Z’s name only became that of Mr E after the death of Y’s father and of Mr E in a serious crime.
   
   

The main issue in dispute was regarding the names of the two youngest children, Y and Z. Specifically:

1. Whether Y’s name should be that of Mr B (Y’s father), or, as the mother proposed, the names of both Mr E and Mr B, hyphenated.
   
   

2. Whether Z’s name should be that of Mr Michelakis (her father), or, as the mother proposed, the names of both Mr E and Mr Michelakis, hyphenated.
   
   

In determining the name change application, and considering the above seven factors, Justice Brasch said the following:

35. I can only imagine it would be a horrifying thing to be in a school yard or at a university and somebody saying to you, “Oh, are you related [to]…?”. I accept Mr E’s surname is not the most unusual name, but I am told and have no reason to doubt that the circumstances of the children’s mother and [Y’s] father is, as submitted earlier by one of the parties “plastered all over the internet.”

36. I think there is something very persuasive in the children’s best interests in terms of their last names, to be saved whatever embarrassment or opprobrium from being linked to the man who perpetrated a serious crime against, in Y’s case, his father and, in Z’s case, against her brother’s father.

37. … I can understand why the mother would like the link of the last name of Mr E from her to the children, but there is a much broader picture here and one that sees her serving a prison sentence for her involvement in a serious crime perpetrated by Mr E.

38. The mother has been Ms Hodson. She has changed her name to that of Mr E. She changed the children’s name to that of Mr E but, on the evidence before me, there is one constant for each of the three children and that is the last name of their father. For X, Mr C. For Y, Mr B, and on the material that is before me, he seems that he is suffering a great loss. His father is no longer alive but to the applicants’ great credit, they are involving Y in the wider paternal family….

39. Z’s father is Mr Michelakis. So, there is a continuity there for each of the children to have the name of their father. Yes, that is three different names, but I am satisfied X, Y and Z have a very strong sibship bond, and I can only imagine that that bond is something that has got them through the loss of Y’s father, the loss of Mr E, who had some involvement in their lives, and the loss of their mother, in what might be a loss for many years.

41. … Arrangements have been put in place for the boys to engage with the mother if they wish. There is an arrangement in place that Z will be able to keep a link to her mother, but there are arrangements in place for Mr C and Mr Michelakis to continue to have time with their children. There is an identity then for X and for Z with their fathers and for Y with his wider paternal family.

42. This really touches on what the ICL told me about the children’s wishes. The degree of identification the children have with whom they are living is one that does not, in reality, apply here. The applicants have the last name of Acerbi but in evidence that is before me, X, Y and Z – as painful as what I am about to say may be to Ms Hodson – have taken to their carers and see them very much in the position of a mother and father. … On all the evidence before me, including expert reports, X, Y and Z, now have stability arising out of absolute tragedy

Turning then to the best interest factors in section 60CC of the Act, her Honour said:

44. I finally then give some thought to the s 60CC factors. This is not really one where promoting the children’s safety is relevant – we are talking about last names – but I have their wishes, which is, of course, an integral part of the s 60CC(2) factors.

45. The capacity to provide for the children and the children’s needs: the children’s needs are best served by having names linked to their fathers, not a name linked to the man who perpetrated a serious crime against Y’s father and, therefore, X and Z losing their sibling Y’s father.

46. Relationships in s 60CC(2): this is not really a relationship matter, suffice to note that X will be spending time [with his father] as he wishes, and Z, per a regime with a man [her father] whose last name each shall now share.

47. ‘Anything else’ is the final s 60CC factor. I do not see anything else.

Justice Brasch made orders for Y’s name to be changed to the last name of Mr B and for Z’s name to be changed to the last name of Mr Michelakis.

Orders were made by consent for X’s last name to be changed to the last name of Mr C (and otherwise regarding arrangements and decision-making responsibility for the children).

The decision in Acerbi highlights that, in considering an application for a change of name, the Court’s paramount consideration is the best interests of the child. That paramount principle applies consistently in all proceedings seeking parenting orders, ensuring that the child’s best interests are the primary and determinative consideration in the Court’s decision-making.

If you would like advice regarding changing your child’s name, or any other family law issues, please contact us on (03) 8672 5222 to arrange an appointment with one of our experienced lawyers.